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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1  
Amici are two former United States District Court 
Judges who spent years overseeing criminal proceed-
ings. They are now law professors who research and 
write about criminal justice policy. They remain ded-
icated to the proper administration of justice. 
Judge Paul G. Cassell was a judge of the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah from 
2002 until 2007. He is now on the faculty of the S.J. 
Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah.  
Judge Nancy Gertner was a judge of the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
from 1994 until 2011, leaving to be on the faculty of 
Harvard Law School. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF 
ARGUMENT  
Criminal defendants should not be penalized with 
plain-error review when they fail to raise in the dis-
trict court objections that circuit courts have uni-
formly foreclosed. When an intervening change in law 
renders those once-futile claims viable, appellate 
courts should treat them as preserved and subject to 
the corresponding standard of appellate review, not 
the four-factor test elaborated in United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). Amici therefore agree 
 
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this amicus 
brief. No counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in 
part. No party, counsel for a party, or any person other than ami-
cus curiae and their counsel made a monetary contribution in-
tended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. 
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with Respondent on the threshold question that the 
preserved-error standard applies, not plain-error re-
view. Amici do not take a position on the other ques-
tions arising in the case, including whether an error 
under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), 
is structural and whether Respondent otherwise sat-
isfies the third and fourth plain-error prongs under 
Olano. 
As former federal district court judges, amici well 
understand the importance of claim preservation. 
When defendants raise their objections first in the 
district court, district judges—who are closest to the 
case—can avoid or fix errors, thereby sparing (or at 
least facilitating) appellate review and potentially 
averting remand or retrial. The contemporaneous-ob-
jection requirement and its appellate counterpart, the 
plain-error rule, also deter sandbagging by defense 
counsel.  
But the interests in judicial economy and fairness 
those rules ordinarily advance are not served when 
the would-be objection is entirely foreclosed by a cir-
cuit consensus this Court later sweeps away. In such 
a scenario, there is nothing to fix and no tactical ad-
vantage to be gained from failing to object. Rigid in-
sistence on claim preservation in those circumstances 
instead actively undermines efficient judicial admin-
istration, as it forces defendants to object at every 
turn, clogging up cases with kitchen-sink briefs and 
wasting the resources of already overburdened coun-
sel and courts. It also unfairly rewards defendants 
whose counsel was either preternaturally prescient or 
ignorant, undiscerning, or even downright obstruc-
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813389
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tionist, while punishing those whose counsel appro-
priately focused on arguments that were more likely 
to succeed. 
The rule Respondent and amici advance here not 
only makes sense but also finds strong support in this 
Court’s precedents—the Government’s argument to 
the contrary notwithstanding. And its circumscribed 
scope should assuage the Court’s concern that recog-
nizing it would promote, rather than frustrate, the 
values that animate claim-preservation rules. Criti-
cally, an unraised claim should not be treated as pre-
served merely because the defendant’s circuit has 
rejected it. Rather, an objection is futile and thus ex-
empt from plain-error review only when all the cir-
cuits to have addressed the claim of error have 
rejected it. 
Because the courts of appeals “uniform[ly]” held 
at the time of Respondent’s plea that knowledge of 
prohibited status was not an element of an offense un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), Government’s 
Opening Brief (OB) 4, Respondent’s claim of error 
should not be subject to plain-error review, even 
though Respondent raised it for the first time on ap-
peal. The judgment below should therefore be af-
firmed if the Court determines that Rehaif error is 
structural or if the Government cannot carry its bur-
den to show on these facts that the error was harm-
less.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813389
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. Respondent’s Futility Exception To Plain-
Error Review For Uniformly Foreclosed 
Arguments Promotes Judicial Economy And 
Fairness. 
At the trial level, the contemporaneous-objection 
rule directs litigants to raise objections “when the 
court ruling … is made or sought.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 
51(b). Plain-error review “sets forth the 
consequences” on appeal when litigants fail to do so. 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135-36 (2009). 
Those two rules work in tandem to “induce the timely 
raising of claims and objections” in district court prior 
to appellate proceedings. Id. at 134. And in the typical 
case, they promote judicial efficiency and the fair 
treatment of parties. See Henderson v. United States, 
568 U.S. 266, 278 (2013); see generally Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 2 (rules of criminal procedure “are to be interpreted 
to provide for the just determination of every criminal 
proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and 
fairness in administration, and to eliminate 
unjustifiable expense and delay”). 
 
As former district court judges, amici well 
understand, and are committed to advancing, 
efficiency and fairness in judicial proceedings. Amici 
are the first to agree that, in ordinary circumstances, 
defendants should timely raise issues in the trial 
court and face heightened appellate review when they 
do not. After all, trial judges’ proximity to the case and 
familiarity with the parties put them “in the best 
position” to address issues brought to their attention 
in the first instance. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134; see 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813389
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generally Neely v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., 386 U.S. 
317, 325 (1967) (stating that some issues “should be 
passed upon by the district court … because of the 
trial judge’s firsthand knowledge of witnesses, 
testimony, and issues”). Avoiding or fixing errors at 
the district court level—e.g., giving a curative 
instruction or granting the defendant “an immediate 
remedy”—can preempt a costly appeal and remand, 
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 140, thereby sparing the 
“needless[] ping-pong back and forth between the 
district court and court of appeals, with the parties 
expending substantial resources fighting over a 
problem that could have been readily identified and 
cured up front.” United States v. Uscanga-Mora, 562 
F.3d 1289, 1294 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J.). At the 
very least, bringing possible errors to the district 
court’s attention ensures that the factual record is 
adequately developed for appeal. See Puckett, 556 
U.S. at 134, 140.  
 
The pairing of the contemporaneous-objection rule 
and plain-error review also promotes fairness in the 
typical case. The contemporaneous-objection rule 
recognizes that it is fair to require a party who 
perceives an error to inform the court and opposing 
counsel of the error right away, rather than 
capitalizing on it by “remaining silent” and “belatedly 
raising the error only if the case does not conclude in 
his favor.” Id. at 134. And plain-error review reduces 
any incentive to “sandbag[]” the prosecution (and the 
district court) in this way. Id.  
 
Critically, however, requiring defendants to raise 
in the district court arguments that are squarely 
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foreclosed across the circuits does nothing to advance 
judicial economy and fundamental fairness. In fact, in 
those “rare circumstances,” “unyielding application of 
the general rule[s]” of contemporaneous objection and 
plain error “would disserve any perceivable interest.” 
Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 379-80 (2002). 
 
A. Efficiency. 
 It is a fundamental maxim that “[g]ood judicial 
administration is not furthered by insistence on futile 
procedure.” Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 681 (1948). 
That is particularly true here. Where uniform 
precedent bars an argument for error, the district 
court cannot “correct or avoid the mistake,” Puckett, 
556 U.S. at 134, because at that point there is no 
mistake at all. The court can only deny the objection. 
The court, in theory, could allow the parties to 
supplement the record based on the defendant’s 
farfetched objection, but the parties, and the district 
court, would be shooting in the dark, not knowing 
what the record would require in the hypothetical 
world in which there were an error.  
 
Without a futility exception, counsel may feel duty 
bound “to file one ‘kitchen sink’ brief after another, 
raising even the most fanciful defenses that could be 
imagined based on long-term logical implications 
from existing precedents.” United States v. Smith, 250 
F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, J., dissenting 
from denial of reh’g en banc). It is not just pointless to 
require a defense attorney to “mak[e] a long and 
virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings 
that were plainly supported by existing precedent,” 
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997), it 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813389
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is harmful. As Justice Scalia put it, requiring a 
defendant to object “when the law is settled against” 
the claim of error “disserve[s] efficiency” and “the 
orderly administration of justice.” Henderson, 568 
U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Reed v. 
Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (explaining in the habeas 
context that it would “actually disrupt” proceedings to 
“encourag[e] defense counsel to include any and all 
remotely plausible constitutional claims that could, 
some day, gain recognition”); see infra 15-16 
(discussing Reed’s applicability to this case).  
  
For one thing, it may leave all but the luckiest 
defendants—the cert-lottery-winning Rehaifs of the 
world—worse off. It is well-documented that defense 
counsel—particularly for the many indigent 
defendants in the criminal justice system—are often 
“overworked and underpaid.” Luis v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 1083, 1095 (2016). “[M]any federal public 
defender organizations and lawyers appointed under 
the Criminal Justice Act serve numerous clients and 
have only limited resources.” Id. (citation omitted). 
When defense counsel devote their limited time to 
pointless or even frivolous objections, they have less 
time to spend developing and presenting more fruitful 
arguments. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 34 (1997) 
(“Resource constraints impose a ceiling on how many 
things counsel can object to, how many claims can 
plausibly be raised.”).  
 
What’s more, bloated arguments are bad 
arguments: As Justice Jackson put it, “receptiveness 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813389
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declines as the number of assigned errors increases. 
Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one.... 
[M]ultiplying assignments of error will dilute and 
weaken a good case and will not save a bad one.” 
Robert Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court, 
25 Temple L.Q. 115, 119 (1951), quoted in Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 752 (1983); see also Joseph 
Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story 90 (William W. 
Story ed. 1851) (“Who’s a great lawyer? He, who aims 
to say [t]he least his cause requires, not all he may.”). 
That is, “[g]ood lawyers, knowing that judges and 
juries have limited time and limited patience, serve 
their clients best when they are judicious in making 
objections.” Bates v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 768 F.3d 
1278, 1295 (11th Cir. 2014). Amici can confirm that in 
the harried district court setting, it is vital that 
defense counsel focus the court’s attention on their 
clients’ most meritorious arguments.  
 
And yet the Government’s position encourages 
defendants “to raise all possible objections at trial 
despite settled law to the contrary…, impeding the 
proceeding[s] and wasting judicial resources.” United 
States v. Baumgardner, 85 F.3d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir. 
1996).  
 
The already-heavily-burdened district courts 
should not have to contend with a flurry of such 
objections. In 2019 alone, each district court judge 
was responsible for an average of 440 civil cases and 
137 criminal cases against new defendants. Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. District Courts—
Judicial Business 2019, https://tinyurl.com/2vds67x9 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2021). And in just the last year, 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813389
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filings in U.S. district courts increased by 13%, while 
terminations “held steady.” Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2020, 
https://tinyurl.com/avxx3duz (last visited Mar. 25, 
2021). The increased workload has led the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to ask Congress to 
create 77 new U.S. district court judgeships and 
convert eight temporary ones to permanent status. 
Andrew Kragie, Federal Judiciary Seeks 79 New 
Judgeships Nationwide, Law360 (Mar. 16, 2021), 
https://tinyurl.com/49zpjfmt (noting that “district 
court filings have increased 47% since 1990 while the 
number of district judges has risen barely 5%”). 
  
A sharp uptick in criminal cases—80% over the 
past 45 years—has contributed to the increase in 
workload. Christopher Slobogin, The Case for a 
Federal Criminal Court System (and Sentencing 
Reform), 108 Cal. L. Rev. 941, 944 (2020). Criminal-
defendant filings rose 11% in 2019 alone, and by 
another 3% in 2020. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 
Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, 
https://tinyurl.com/asf6svap (last visited Mar. 20, 
2021); Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2020, 
supra. It is also taking longer to resolve those cases: 
Despite speedy trial rules, the median length of a 
federal criminal case from initiation to termination 
has increased by over 200% in the last 45 years. 
Slobogin, supra, at 946-47.  
 
The contemporaneous-objection rule and plain-
error review are meant to streamline the judicial 
process, but in the circumstances of this case, they 
would have the perverse effect of clogging 
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overburdened district courts with frivolous filings, 
diminishing the quality of advocacy, and wasting 
precious resources. In short, it is “contrary to the 
efficient administration of justice, to expect a 
defendant to object at trial where existing law 
appears so clear as to foreclose any possibility of 
success.” United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 
1139 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  
 
B. Fairness. 
The Government’s rule also does nothing to 
advance the fairness interests behind claim-
preservation rules. And indeed, it is itself deeply 
unfair. 
 
Critically, when an objection is thoroughly 
foreclosed, there is no risk of sandbagging—the 
principal fairness concern that underlies claim-
preservation rules. Supra 5. The point of sandbagging 
is to withhold an objection to an error the trial court 
could have fixed so that the defendant can keep in her 
back pocket a basis for reversal on appeal should she 
lose at trial. But the defendant gets no strategic 
benefit from sitting on an objection to an error that is 
at that time, and so far as anyone can reasonably 
anticipate, non-existent. See Rosales-Mireles v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1911 (2018) (noting the 
low risk of sandbagging where any benefit is “highly 
speculative”). If, as this Court said in Henderson, the 
“lawyer who would deliberately forgo objection now 
because he perceives some slightly expanded chance 
to argue for ‘plain error’ later” is like a “unicorn,” 568 
U.S. at 276, then the lawyer who deliberately stays 
silent in the hope that this Court will overturn the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813389
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circuit consensus while the case is still on appeal and 
give her a second bite at the apple is a creature 
beyond fairy tale. 
 
The real unfairness lies in saddling defendants 
with plain-error review for failing to raise thoroughly 
foreclosed claims that are only later proven viable. 
See McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1274 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., concurring in result only) (“To 
penalize a petitioner for failing to make a claim on 
appeal that had been explicitly rejected by every 
circuit in the country would be patently unfair.”). As 
the Second Circuit has put it, “If we were to penalize 
defendants for failing to challenge entrenched 
precedent, we would be insisting upon an omniscience 
on the part of defendants about the course of the law 
that we do not have as judges.” United States v. Viola, 
35 F.3d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1994), abrogated on other 
grounds by Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 
(1997); see infra 21, 24 n.8 (discussing Viola).  
 
The Government argues it is nevertheless 
worthwhile to require timely objections, even where, 
as in this case, “circuit precedent accords with 
uniform precedent in other circuits” in foreclosing the 
objection. OB26. After all, the Government says, the 
Rehaif petitioner ultimately succeeded in persuading 
this Court to knock down the wall of adverse 
precedent. Id. But this Court has already recognized 
that the “remote possibility” that a claim will succeed 
is no reason to reject a futility exception. Reed, 468 
U.S. at 15. Anyway, and as Respondent notes, 
Rehaif’s objection was not at that time futile—his 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813389
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circuit had not yet directly addressed the specific 
objection he raised. Resp. Br. 17-18. 
 
It is not reasonable or fair to expect defendants 
whose objections are truly futile to nevertheless raise 
them, especially given the conventional wisdom about 
how judges are likely to react to futile arguments. 
While amici believe that most judges would not 
retaliate against litigants, this fear might reasonably 
dissuade defense counsel from objecting. See, e.g., 
United States v. Baker, 489 F.3d 366, 372 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (noting that defendant who objects to a 
particular Rule 11 error “risks angering the judge” 
and “possibly encourages the court to impose a more 
severe sentence”); Toby J. Heytens, Managing 
Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 Yale 
L.J. 922, 989 n.363 (2006) (noting that “lawyers may 
refrain from making (and thus preserving) certain 
kinds of arguments out of a desire to avoid alienating 
judges before whom they regularly appear”). Counsel 
raising futile arguments may also fear sanctions. See, 
e.g., United States v. Robinson, 251 F.3d 594, 596 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“There is no legal objection to the 
imposition of sanctions for frivolous filings in a 
criminal case ....”); In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 550 
(9th Cir. 1989) (imposing $2,500 sanction on defense 
counsel for “reassert[ing] an argument in a petition 
for rehearing which was summarily rejected on direct 
appeal, and which fl[ew] in the face of unambiguous, 
firmly established law”); see also Richard P. Mauro, 
The Chilling Effect that the Threat of Sanctions Can 
Have on Effective Representation in Capital Cases, 36 
Hofstra L. Rev. 417, 417-19 (2007).  
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Counsel may also reasonably stay silent out of 
respect for their “responsibility not to annoy or 
antagonize judge or jury by objections perceived by 
the judge to be meritless”—as “impatience or 
undisguised incredulity on the part of the judge all too 
easily may be translated in the minds of the jury into 
a suggestion of insubstantiality of defense and of 
grasping at straws.” Honeycutt v. Mahoney, 698 F.2d 
213, 219 (4th Cir. 1983) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
Defense counsel, in other words, find themselves in 
the precarious position of having to raise objections 
they know the judge will overrule at the expense of 
their standing with the court in order to avert plain-
error review. At the very least, and as explained 
above, raising foreclosed arguments will draw 
attention away from arguments that remain viable 
and so may lower the defendant’s chances of 
prevailing on those points. Supra 7-8. 
 
In the end, the Government’s rule rewards 
defendants with undiscerning counsel (those not 
judicious enough to focus on colorable claims), 
uninformed counsel (those too ignorant of the state of 
the law to know that the argument is foreclosed by 
precedent), and the highly risk-tolerant (those willing 
to chance upsetting the judge or jury, or risk burying 
other better arguments, to press Hail-Mary 
objections), while punishing defendants with prudent 
counsel. It does so even though all those defendants 
are similarly situated in the way that matters: The 
law was squarely against them at trial but in their 
favor by the time the case was on appeal. See 
Henderson, 568 U.S. at 274 (cautioning against 
applying plain-error review in such a way that would 
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result in “unjustifiably different treatment of 
similarly situated individuals”).  
 
II. Authority From This Court And Others 
Supports Respondent’s Futility Exception. 
Contrary to what the Government says, a futility 
exception when uniform circuit precedent forecloses 
an objection finds “meaningful support” in both this 
Court’s precedents and lower-court decisions. OB25. 
Several lines of authority bolster it, and none bars it.  
A. This Court’s cases support the futility 
exception. 
In closely related contexts—including direct ap-
peals—this Court has recognized that futility should 
excuse procedural defaults. 
1. For starters, the Court in O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 
U.S. 92 (1966) (per curiam), held that a defendant’s 
failure to raise in state court a then-futile objection 
later made viable by an intervening decision of this 
Court did not constitute an adequate state ground to 
preclude the Court’s direct review (and reversal) of 
the conviction. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 
437, 439 (1969) (characterizing O’Connor). Defendant 
O’Connor did not object when the prosecutor com-
mented negatively on his invocation of his right to re-
main silent; he raised the issue only upon petitioning 
this Court, which had recently held in Griffin v. Cali-
fornia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), that such practice violates 
the Fifth Amendment. Because O’Connor could not 
“be charged with anticipating the Griffin decision,” 
the Court explained that his “failure to object in the 
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state courts cannot bar [him] from asserting [his] fed-
eral right” or “strip him of his right to attack the prac-
tice following its invalidation by this Court.” 385 U.S. 
at 93; see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 746 
n.* (1967) (citing O’Connor and noting that the claim, 
prior to Griffin, “did not raise an ‘arguable’ issue”).   
O’Connor was no one-off. In Grosso v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 62, 70-72 (1968), the Court reversed 
on direct review a defendant’s state-court convictions 
for failing to pay an occupational tax on illegal gam-
bling proceeds—notwithstanding the defendant’s fail-
ure to object in state court that his convictions were 
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s privi-
lege against self-incrimination. At the time of trial, 
that objection was foreclosed by this Court’s prece-
dents, which the Court then overruled in the interim. 
Id. at 67, 70-71.2  
 
2 In a footnote in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 
233, 244 n.8 (1977), the Court suggested that the state could en-
force its normal forfeiture rules even for objections that were 
foreclosed by state precedent. But that was dicta: The defendant 
had raised the objection on direct review in the state court, which 
did not find that it was procedurally defaulted. Id. at 237-40. 
Moreover, the Court did not say whether a procedural default of 
a futile objection would affect federal court review, either di-
rectly by the Supreme Court (as at issue in O’Connor and Grosso) 
or on federal collateral review. See Morrison v. United States, No. 
16-cv-1517, 2019 WL 2472520, at *8-9 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2019) 
(granting motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
where petitioner showed cause per Reed). To maintain con-
sistency with O’Connor, the footnote is best read as addressing 
only state-court proceedings. 
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2. The Court has endorsed the futility exception 
outside of the direct review context, as well. For in-
stance, in Reed, the Court explained that, generally, 
a state-court defendant’s failure to raise a timely ob-
jection under the state’s procedure results in a proce-
dural default that prevents the federal court from 
vindicating his or her claim on habeas review. 468 
U.S. at 13-14. But the Court recognized an exception 
and held that the defendant had “cause” to excuse the 
default because the objection was “not reasonably 
available” at the time, a condition that occurs when 
(among other things) “a near-unanimous body of 
lower court authority” is aligned against the defend-
ant. Id. at 16-17 (quotation marks and citation omit-
ted); see also Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 709 n.19 
(5th Cir. 1979) (excusing default where “the apparent 
futility of objecting to an alleged constitutional viola-
tion excuses a failure to object”); Estelle v. Smith, 451 
U.S. 454, 468 n.12 (1981) (adopting reasoning of Fifth 
Circuit in Smith v. Estelle).  
The Government correctly observes (at OB27) 
that “prejudice” is also required to overcome a proce-
dural default in the habeas context. Reed, 468 U.S. at 
11-12. It makes sense that the petitioner would need 
to show something more—like prejudice—to excuse 
forfeiture in federal habeas cases. After all, “[f]ederal 
habeas challenges to state convictions … entail 
greater finality problems and special comity con-
cerns.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982).3 In 
 
3 In Engle, the Court declined to find cause to excuse a pro-
cedural default because (unlike in Reed) “numerous courts” had 
agreed with the defendant’s basic position. 456 U.S. at 132-33; 
see Reed, 468 U.S. at 19-20 (distinguishing Engle). 
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federal cases on direct review, by contrast, “society’s 
legitimate interest in the finality of the judgment has 
[not yet] been perfected” and “considerations of com-
ity” are absent. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 
152-53, 164, 166 (1982). Indeed, where at least one of 
those interests (finality) was absent in cases like 
O’Connor and Grosso, the Court did not require the 
defendant to demonstrate prejudice before overlook-
ing the procedural default. Here, both finality and 
comity concerns are absent, making the case for the 
futility exception even stronger than it was in those 
cases. Ultimately, though, the Government’s argu-
ment is a non sequitur: To recognize the futility ex-
ception for federal cases on direct review is not 
necessarily to dispense with the prejudice inquiry. See 
Resp. Br. 15 n.6. A finding of futility means that the 
ordinary standard of review for preserved errors ap-
plies, which in most cases will involve a harmless-er-
ror analysis. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); infra 26. 
3. The futility exception also accords with the 
well-settled principle that appellate courts directly re-
viewing convictions should apply the law as it cur-
rently stands, not as it stood at the time of trial. See 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); Washington, 
12 F.3d at 1138-39 (describing rule that the court 
“may consider issues not raised at trial where a su-
pervening decision has changed the law in appellant’s 
favor and the law was so well-settled at the time of 
trial that any attempt to challenge it would have ap-
peared pointless” as “a corollary to the general princi-
ple that an appellate court should apply the law in 
effect at the time of appeal”). In Griffith, the Court 
recognized the fundamental unfairness that comes 
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from denying defendants whose cases are still on di-
rect review the opportunity to avail themselves of fa-
vorable intervening Supreme Court authority. 479 
U.S. at 323, 327-28. The restrictive view of claim-
preservation the Government advances will deny 
many defendants the full benefit of Griffith’s hold-
ing—which the Court made clear applies “to all 
cases … pending on direct review … with no excep-
tion.” Id. at 328 (emphasis added). It would instead 
leave them only with plain-error review.4 And, as ex-
plained, it would do so for no good reason. Supra § I. 
B. Lower court cases support the futility 
exception. 
Looking beyond this Court, lower courts, both 
state and federal, have also endorsed a futility excep-
tion like the one Respondent and amici advocate. Con-
tra OB26. 
1. Several state supreme courts treat as preserved 
futile objections, subjecting them to the ordinary 
standard of review (rather than the state-law version 
of plain-error review) or rejecting waiver and forfei-
ture arguments that would otherwise render the 
 
4 While United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005), 
noted in dicta that it “expect[ed]” courts applying supervening 
Supreme Court precedent to continue to ask “whether the issue 
was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test,” the 
Court had no cause to (and did not) address whether those “or-
dinary prudential doctrines” apply in the extraordinary situa-
tion where a circuit consensus foreclosed the argument.   
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claim unreviewable.5 These courts have rightly recog-
nized that “the rationale for denying the defendant a 
more favorable standard of review is not applicable” 
and “considerations of fundamental fairness weigh 
against applying the less favorable standard of review 
to the defendant.” Vasquez, 923 N.E.2d at 532-33. And 
they acknowledge that stringent application of 
preservation rules in this context “would be counter-
productive to the goal of judicial efficiency.” Robinson, 
253 P.3d at 89.   
2. Federal appellate courts have also seen the 
folly in imposing plain-error review on futile objec-
tions. See Br. in Opp. 11-12. As the Government 
points out, several of those cases involved defendants 
who failed to renew an objection already made, OB26, 
 
5 See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 253 P.3d 84, 89-90 (Wash. 
2011) (recognizing exception to state-law equivalent of Rule 
52(b) where the court issues a new controlling constitutional in-
terpretation after the completion of the defendant’s trial that 
overrules the existing one and applies retroactively); Common-
wealth v. Vasquez, 923 N.E.2d 524, 530-33 (Mass. 2010) (declin-
ing to apply less favorable standard of review where intervening 
Supreme Court decision abrogated then-governing precedent); 
see also People v. Sandoval, 161 P.3d 1146, 1153 n.4 (Cal. 2007) 
(excusing forfeiture where objection “would have been futile” be-
cause trial court was bound by precedent to deny it); State v. 
Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 307 (Conn. 2005), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Harris, 191 A.3d 119 (Conn. 2018) (excusing 
waiver where argument was foreclosed); State v. Goodyear, 413 
P.2d 566, 567-68 (Ariz. 1966) (rejecting wavier argument where 
objection “would have been futile” under established law at the 
time of trial), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Bush, 423 
P.3d 370 (Ariz. 2018); see also Resp. Br. 20-21 & n.8 (citing addi-
tional state cases).  
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but those courts did not uniformly limit their endorse-
ment of the futility exception to those circumstances. 
E.g., Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d at 1294 (stating 
broadly that “counsel will not be stuck with plain er-
ror review for having failed to voice an objection when 
doing so would have been futile”). And again, the dif-
ference in contexts only strengthens the case for the 
futility exception’s application here. If it is futile to 
take further exception after the district court over-
rules the objection because it is unlikely the court will 
change its mind and adopt the defendant’s position, 
see Thornley v. Penton Publ’g, Inc., 104 F.3d 26, 30 (2d 
Cir. 1997), it is even more pointless to raise an objec-
tion when the district court cannot adopt the defend-
ant’s position in the first place because of controlling 
precedent uniform across the circuits. 
In any event, cases involving a failure to renew an 
objection are not the only ones in which the courts 
have spoken approvingly of a futility exception. They 
have also done so where the defendant never raised 
an objection. See Resp. Br. 19-20 (discussing cases); 
see, e.g., United States v. Cano-Varela, 497 F.3d 1122, 
1132 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J.) (noting that “we 
are hesitant to apply a heightened standard of review 
[of unpreserved Rule 11(c)(1) violations] when defense 
counsel did not object to receiving the court’s help [in 
persuading defendant to plead guilty],” though ulti-
mately reversing under the plain-error standard); 
United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1109 n.6 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (taking a “departure from the 
usual rule that we will not consider claims of error 
raised here for the first time” where “counsel could 
well have thought the objection futile”); United States 
v. Rivera, 513 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, 
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J.) (rejecting government’s waiver argument because 
“counsel could have considered objection to be futile”); 
cf. Baker, 489 F.3d at 373 (observing that a “blanket 
plain error standard” ignores that some cases are “fit-
ting candidate[s]” for “a less exacting standard than 
plain error”).  
In the habeas context, too, several circuit courts 
have followed Reed in recognizing that it would be 
“pointless (and indeed wasteful) to require a defend-
ant to raise … a [once-]futile objection in the district 
court.” English v. United States, 42 F.3d 473, 479 (9th 
Cir. 1994); see Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 
296 (7th Cir. 2018) (relying on Reed to excuse proce-
dural default where Supreme Court “abrogated a sub-
stantial body of circuit court precedent” rejecting 
defendant’s untimely claim). 
Even federal courts that treat foreclosed objec-
tions as unpreserved and therefore redressable on ap-
peal only if Olano’s four factors are met have 
nevertheless modified that analysis to ease the harsh-
ness of plain-error review. The Second Circuit, for in-
stance, has said that “[w]hen a supervening decision 
alters settled law, the three Olano conditions for re-
viewing plain error under Rule 52(b) still must be 
met, but with one crucial distinction: the burden of 
persuasion as to prejudice (or, more precisely, lack of 
prejudice) is borne by the government, and not the de-
fendant.” Viola, 35 F.3d at 42; see Baumgardner, 85 
F.3d at 1309 n.2 (“[W]e find the Viola analysis persua-
sive,” for it “recogniz[es] that a defendant should not 
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be penalized for failing to challenge entrenched prec-
edent.”).6 
C. Nothing prevents this Court from 
adopting the futility exception. 
As explained above, good reason and good author-
ity support the futility exception. No rule or precedent 
prevents the Court from treating the error here as 
preserved and therefore exempt from plain-error re-
view. 
The Government relies principally on Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. at 467-68. See OB25, 27. But 
as Respondent has explained (Br. in Opp. 14; Resp. 
Br. 17), and the Government does not contest, a cir-
cuit split over the underlying legal issue put the de-
fendant in Johnson on notice that an objection would 
not have been futile. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 
U.S. 506, 527 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) 
(noting circuit split). 
The Government’s reliance (at OB27) on Bousley 
v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998), fails for 
that same reason. There, the Court refused to excuse 
for futility a procedural default in a collateral attack 
on a conviction. As in Johnson, the circuits were split 
 
6 Although some Second Circuit panels have questioned Vi-
ola’s validity after Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), 
see, e.g., United States v. Grote, 961 F.3d 105, 116 n.3 (2d Cir. 
2020), it has not been overruled and has been applied since John-
son, see, e.g., United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 
1997); United States v. Monteleone, 257 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
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at the time the defendant failed to raise the underly-
ing legal claim in the lower courts. See United States 
v. Bousley, 950 F.2d 727 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming 
conviction on direct appeal); Bailey v. United States, 
516 U.S. 137, 142 (1995), superseded by statute as rec-
ognized in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 
(2016) (noting “conflict” in the circuits going back to 
at least 1988). Bousley, then, rejected a far broader 
notion of futility than the one advanced here. See in-
fra 24-25.7  
The Government also attempts to draw support 
from this Court’s statement in Johnson that it lacks 
the authority to create “an exception” to Rule 52(b). 
OB27 (quoting 520 U.S. at 466). But that assumes 
that Rule 52(b) applies in the first place. It does not. 
As Respondent has explained, Rule 52 does not say 
that “unpreserved [errors] may be addressed only un-
der Rule 52(b),” and indeed, the preexisting law that 
Rule 52 codifies, along with the values of fairness and 
efficiency the rule must be “interpreted” to advance, 
show that such errors should not be addressed under 
Rule 52(b) at all. Resp. Br. 9; see id. at 9-13.   
 
7 One of the appellate decisions the Government cites (at 
OB25-26)—United States v. Knoll, 116 F.3d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 
1997)—is inapposite for this same reason. In the other two, 
where the courts reviewed for plain error, the defendant did not 
argue that a less stringent standard of review should apply be-
cause the unraised argument was futile. See United States v. 
Johnson, 979 F.3d 632, 637 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. 
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547-48 (4th Cir. 2005). Those decisions, 
therefore, should be given little weight and anyway are wrong 
for the reasons offered elsewhere in this brief. 
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Rule 51, too, takes futile objections out of Rule 
52(b)’s ambit. That rule provides that “[i]f a party 
does not have an opportunity to object to a ruling or 
order, the absence of an objection does not later prej-
udice that party.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 51. When an objec-
tion is thoroughly foreclosed across the circuits, a 
defendant lacks a meaningful “opportunity” to object 
to it, and so should not be “prejudice[d]” by the impo-
sition of the plain-error standard.  
Put another way, Rule 52(b) applies only to for-
feited errors, but a defendant cannot forfeit an error 
that is not available in the first place: “[A]n appellant 
can only abandon an argument that was actually 
available to him, and thus may raise a new argument 
based on an intervening change in the law during the 
pendency of an appeal.” United States v. Lockhart, 
947 F.3d 187, 196 n.4 (4th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks 
omitted).8  
III. Respondent’s Futility Exception Is 
Appropriately Narrow. 
 The futility exception here is narrow, applying 
only in circumstances where it would indeed serve ef-
ficiency and justice.   
First, it applies only to unraised claims that were 
foreclosed across the board. A claim is futile, and 
therefore tested for harmlessness rather than plain 
 
8 If the Court nonetheless believes it must apply Rule 52(b) 
to all unraised objections, even those that were foreclosed by uni-
form circuit authority, it should adopt the Second Circuit’s ap-
proach, as articulated in Viola, which operates within Rule 
52(b)’s strictures. See 35 F.3d at 42; supra 21-22. 
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error, only where every circuit to address the question 
(including the defendant’s) has rejected it. In other 
words, it is not good enough that the argument “was 
unacceptable to [a] particular court at [a] particular 
time.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (quoting Engle, 456 
U.S. at 130 n. 35) (emphasis added). It must be “more 
generally unacceptable,” Smith, 250 F.3d at 1075 
(Wood, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc), with a “nationwide rejection, by every court [to 
address it],” McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1273 (Barkett, J., 
concurring in result only). Compare Engle, 456 U.S. 
at 133 (claim not futile if “numerous courts agreed” 
with it at the time). In those circumstances, the objec-
tion truly is futile and efficiency and fairness counsel 
in favor of treating unraised claims as preserved. 
This is not a difficult standard to administer. In-
deed, courts already determine whether unraised ob-
jections would have been futile when they decide 
whether a preservation rule constitutes an adequate 
state ground to bar direct Supreme Court review or 
whether there is cause to excuse a procedural default 
on federal habeas review. See supra 14-16, 21. They 
do the same when applying doctrines of administra-
tive exhaustion. Resp. Br. 15. More broadly, courts 
regularly ascertain the state of the law when deter-
mining, for instance, whether the law is clearly estab-
lished for purposes of habeas relief or qualified 
immunity. 
This case is proof of the rule’s administrability, for 
even the Government acknowledges that Respondent 
was prosecuted “[c]onsistent with the courts of ap-
peals’ uniform interpretation of the felon-in-posses-
sion offense at that time.” OB4 (emphasis added); see 
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Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2195 (observing that, at the time 
of Rehaif’s plea, “no court of appeals had required the 
Government to establish a defendant’s knowledge of 
his status in the analogous context of felon-in-posses-
sion prosecutions”). 
Second, the futility exception just means that the 
plain-error framework is not applicable. It does not 
mean that the conviction or sentence must be vacated. 
Defendants who can avail themselves of the futility 
exception must still demonstrate that there was error 
under the new law.  
All agree there was error in Respondent’s case—
indeed, the Government concedes the Rehaif error 
was plain. OB8. But in other cases, it may be that, 
even under the new law, there was no problem with 
the proceedings. That is especially likely when the in-
tervening decision of this Court merely “fine tune[s]” 
the law in the circuits, rather than reversing or over-
ruling it. United States v. McGuire, 79 F.3d 1396, 
1410 (5th Cir.) (Wiener, J., concurring), opinion va-
cated on reh’g en banc, 90 F.3d 107 (5th Cir. 1996). 
And unless the error is structural or otherwise falls 
within a category of errors “that can be corrected re-
gardless of their effect on the outcome,” the Govern-
ment will still have an opportunity (and the burden) 
to avert vacatur by showing that any error was harm-
less. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35. Under that standard, 
defendants who are “manifestly guilty” (OB 43) will 
not be entitled to relief.   
Third, the futility exception is not a one-way 
ratchet that favors only defendants. As Respondent 
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indicates, the Government would also be able to avail 
itself of it. See Resp. Br. 14 n.5. 
CONCLUSION  
For the foregoing reasons, the plain-error stand-
ard does not apply, and this Court should affirm the 
judgment below if it determines either that Rehaif er-
ror is structural or that the Government cannot carry 
its burden to show that the error was harmless. 
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